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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction of manslaughter,
a second degree felony, and from an order denying appellant's motion
for a new trial.
Ann. § 78-2a-3<2)(f)

This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code
(Supp.

1988).

The District Court entered its judgment on January 12f 1989.
Appellant subsequently filed a motion for a new trial on January 18,
1989, which was denied by the trial court on February 8f 1989.
Appellant filed her timely notice of appeal on March 3, 1989.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Whether the District Court erred in a bench trial in denying

appellant's motion for judgment of acquittal made at the conclusion of
the State's case-in-chief because the State had failed to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that appellant did not act in self-defense.
2.

Whether the District Court's verdict of manslaughter was

against the clear weight of the evidence on the issue of self-defense
as the evidence did not establish the absence of self-defense beyond a
reasonable doubt.
3.

Whether the District Court erred in denying appellant's

motion for a new trial based on an erroneous and unsupported conclusion that there was a cessation in hostilities sufficient to establish
beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant did not act in self-defense.
4.

Whether the District Court's order of restitution was legal.

STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On November 30, 1988, appellant was found guilty by the District
Court, sitting without a jury, of manslaughter.
found not guilty of second degree murder.

Appellant was also

On January 9, 1989, the

District Court sentenced her to a term of imprisonment of not less
than one yearf nor more than 15 years.

The District Court further

ordered her to pay restitution to the decedent's family (her in-laws)
in an amount to be set by the Board of Pardons at the time of release.
On January 18, 1989, appellant filed a motion for a new trial, supported by an affidavit,

based on certain findings made by the District

Court at the time it rendered its verdict.

On February 8, 1989, the

District Court denied appellant's motion for a new trial.

This appeal

followed.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

The State's Case-in-Chief;
On the evening of July 8, 1988, in Tooele County, Sandy

Magana heard someone crying, looked out the window of her condominium
and saw Kay Strieby, the Appellant, sobbing hysterically.

Mrs. Strieby

came to Ms. Magana's door and asked her to call the paramedics because
Chris Strieby, the decedent, had been shot.

Mrs. Strieby told

Ms. Magana that she shot the decedent because he was beating her and
would not stop, but "just kept coming."

(Tr. 126-32.)

In response to Ms. Magana's call received by Tooele County
Dispatch, Deputy Lynn Bush went to the Striebys1 condominium in
Stansbury Park.

Deputy Bush found the decedent lying on the landing

midway up the stairway leading to the second floor of the condominium.

A hat and a blue plastic cup were also on the landing and a

gun was lying on a night stand in an upstairs bedroom.

(Tr. 15-26.)

Deputy Bush observed that Mrs. Strieby had numerous bruises on her
face, including a swollen eye, a swollen lip and a mark on her forehead.

She was also extremely upset.

(Tr. 38-42.)

Detective Alan James and Sheriff Don Proctor took a taped
statement from Mrs. Strieby following the shooting as she sat in the
sherifffs car at the scene.

Mrs. Strieby told Detective James and

Sheriff Proctor that she and the decedent had been arguing since the
previous day.

On the morning of July 8f she got up early in order to

be at work in Grantsville by 6:00 a.m.

After work, she went home, did

some housework and then went to the Strieby welding shop in Tooele to
talk with the decedent.

They arguedf and the decedent told Mrs. Strieby

she "was a cunt and not to come around him anymore ...".

He gave her

the "finger," and she left and drove to the Eagle's, a private club in
Tooele, where she talked with friends and had a few drinks.

She then

returned to the Strieby welding trailer to pick up the decedent.

She

and the decedent argued again and the argument ended with him knocking

The condominium stairway has one flight of stairs from the entryway
up to the landing, a 180° turn at the landing, and a second flight of
stairs from the landing up to the second floor. (Tr. 22.)
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her down.

Mrs. Strieby then called her friendf Charlotte Gourley, who
2
came and took her home. (Ex. 14 at 2, 7-8.)
Don McCord, the decedent's best friend, was at Strieby

Welding drinking with the decedent on the day in question.

According

to McCord, the decedent had lied to Mrs. Strieby about spending the
night with another woman.

While the couple often argued, the argument

that afternoon seemed more intense on the decedent's part, as well as
Mrs. Strieby's.

Mr. McCord testified that he and the decedent had

been drinking all day and that the decedent had already drunk approximately two-thirds of a fifth of vodka when Mrs. Strieby returned to
the trailer that afternoon.

By that time, he and the decedent were

drinking from a fresh half gallon of vodka.

After Mrs. Strieby left,

McCord and the decedent continued to drink their half gallon.

(Tr.

68-71, 81-85.)
When Mrs. Strieby got home, she lay down to rest for a few
minutes.

When the decedent's nephew, Joey Gruenwald, and his friend,

both of whom were staying at the condominium temporarily, came home,
Mrs. Strieby asked them to drive to the trailer and bring the decedent
home "before he gets too drunk."

(Ex. 14 at 2.)

Joey Gruenwald and

his friend went to the trailer and found the decedent still drinking.
They told him that they "wanted to drive him home because [they]
didn't want him driving home drunk either."

They finally convinced

Exhibit 14 is a transcript of appellant's taped statement to
Detective James and Sheriff Proctor.
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him to go with them.

They dropped him off outside the condominium and

left for Salt Lake City without going inside.

(Tr. 107-113.)

As soon as the boys left, the decedent entered the condominium and immediately began yelling obscenities at Mrs. Striebyf
grabbing her and threatening to kill her.

As Mrs. Strieby told

Detective James:
I opened the door and the kids left and he just,
just started hitting me and started calling me
names and saying I did things I didn't.... [Hie
said, "I'll kill ya." He said, "I'll beat you to
death. No wonder your first husband beat you.
You're a mouthy bitch."
Mrs. Strieby repeatedly pleaded with the decedent to leave her alone,
and also asked him to give her a few days and she would move out.

But

he refused:
[Hie said, "I ain't giving you no time at all."
...
I said, "Chris you can't be like this," and
he said he'd kill me, he'd beat me to death. He
said, "If the beatin' you thought you got at dad's
trailer was bad today, you wait until I get ahold
of you again."
(Ex. 14 at 3, 4, 8.)
Mrs. Strieby pulled away from the decedent's grasp and ran
away from him up the stairs.

The decedent grabbed Mrs. Strieby by the

leg and dragged her down the stairs on her back and neck.

Mrs. Strieby

again asked the decedent "please ... just leave me alone, I just, give
me a couple a days," but the decedent was "grabbing" and "shaking"
her, so she struggled free and ran upstairs.

(Ex. 14 at 4; Tr. 163.)

Although Mrs. Strieby was too shaken to recall exactly how she got the
decedent's gun from their bedroom closet.
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She had it when he came at

her up the stairs.

She begged him to quit beating her.

The decedent

kept coming:
He said. . . . "I'll kill you before you can pull
the trigger." He told me to go in and pull the
trigger. He could knock me down four times before
I could pull the trigger. There wasn't enough
dust to bury him....
(Ex. 14 at 4, 8.)
hit her again.

Mrs. Strieby again pleaded with the decedent not to

He told her to "Pull the trigger you fucking bitch,

cause it ain't loaded and I can make it up the stairs before you pull
it anyway."

(Ex. 14 at 8.)

As the decedent came charging up the

second flight of stairs from the landing, he again told her that he
was going to kill her and she fired one shot which killed him.
Mrs. Strieby recalled that "I don't really remember pulling the
trigger, God Almighty.

It hurt my arm, it threw my arm clear back and

I am so, oh God Almighty ... it was horrible.
my neck is sore, my back is sore.

It was terrible.

I, oh

He really whopped me a good one in

the neck and my neck is really sore but I didn't mean to hurt him...."
(Ex. 14 at 5, 8; Tr. 25.)

After her arrest, Mrs. Strieby was taken to

the emergency room at the local hospital for treatment for the neck
and back injuries sustained during the beating.
Dr. Edward Sweeney, the state medical examiner who examined
the body, testified that the decedent was a "heavyset man" weighing
about 200 pounds with a "muscular development."
was a gunshot wound.

The cause of death

Consistent with Mrs. Strieby's statement, the

path of the bullet was a downward angle, with the bullet entering the
decedent's mouth and coming to rest at the back of his neck.
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The

decedent's alcohol level was .25 milligrams percent, or approximately
three times the legal limit for the State of Utah.

Dr. Sweeney testi-

fied that alcohol affects the highest levels first - those "that
separate man from animal."

Dr. Sweeney also testified that the

decedent's self-control and judgment would clearly have been affected
at his .25 blood alcohol level and his coordination and reflexes would
also have been affected.

(Tr. 117-121.)

At the conclusion of the government's case, appellant's
counsel argued that the State had not met its burden of proof on the
critical element of self-defense.

Counsel pointed out that overwhelm-

ing evidence of self-defense had been introduced in the State's case
and there had been no evidence to overcome the State's heavy burden to
prove that appellant did not act in self-defense.

(Tr. 298-304.)

The

government responded that appellant's voluntary statement to the
sheriff was the only evidence it had of what occurred at the Strieby
house on the night in question.

(Tr. 313-314.)

The District Court

denied appellant's motion for judgment of acquittal on both second
degree murder and manslaughter without explanation.

2.

The Defense Case:
Appellant testified in her own defense and elaborated on and

expanded her voluntary statement to Detective James and Sheriff
Proctor.

In April of 1988f after having known each other for several

years and having previously lived together, Mrs. Strieby and the
decedent were married.

At the time of the marriage, the decedent was
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estranged from, and had no contact with, his father and brothers, A
few months later, he began spending time with his family again.

Since

that time, in the two months immediately prior to July 8, the decedent
became emotionally upset due to his family problems.
ing excessively and became very short-tempered.

He began drink-

(Tr. 218-226.)

On July 7, 1988, the decedent was angry because they had not
had sex for some time, and he blamed Mrs. Strieby.

He told her that

if he did not get sex from her soon he would "go someplace else for
it."

Mrs. Strieby told him that his excessive drinking was the cause

of the problem, as he was unable to maintain an erection when drunk.
She told the decedent that if he drank less they probably could have
sex.

Mrs. Strieby then went upstairs to bed.

Approximately twenty

minutes later, the decedent followed her upstairs, slapped her in the
face with his penis and demanded sex.
her alone.

Mrs. Strieby asked him to leave

The decedent then "jumped on" Mrs. Strieby and attempted

to have intercourse with her "from behind".
went back downstairs and slept on the couch.

The decedent eventually
(Tr. 229-230.)

The following morning, July 8, 1988, Mrs. Strieby got up
early and went to her job as a seamstress in Grantsville.

On Fridays,

she only worked until 10:00 a.m., so she returned home at that time
and did some light housework and began preparing dinner.

After some

time, she drove to the Strieby welding shop where she and the decedent
argued again.

She then spent some time at the Eagle"s, returning to

the Strieby welding trailer in the late afternoon.

Mrs. Strieby

intended to pick up the decedent and take him home, but they argued,
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so she left him the keys and had Charlotte Gourley drive her home.
(Tr. 231-238.)
When the decedent, who was drunk, came home, he immediately
attacked Mrs. Strieby.

The decedent was substantially bigger and

stronger than Mrs. Strieby.

Although they had argued before, he had

never before attacked her as he did that night.
before threatened to kill her.

Mrs. Strieby testified that "the door

flew open" and the attack began.
names.

He had also never

He began beating her and calling her

When Mrs. Strieby asked for some time to get out, he told her

she "didn't have any time."

Although she tried to open and escape

through the front door, the decedent slammed it shut.

He told her

that "two other women had left him, and the only way [she] could leave
was on a stretcher."

(Tr. 240-241.)

As she fought off the decedent's attack in the entryway,
Mrs. Strieby ran up the stairs to the landing.

The decedent grabbed

her and pulled her back down the stairs by her legs.

As she was

pulled down the steps, she hit her head on the landing and stairs.
Mrs. Strieby had broken her back before and had a long history of
serious back injuries, including four prior back surgeries. To
protect herself, she said she "put my hands up and tried to double my
body up so I would —

I was scared because of my back, and I was

scared because of my head.

I didn't know if I had hurt my head bad.

He just wouldn't leave me alone."

(Tr. 241-244.)

Throughout the attack, the decedent told Mrs. Strieby that
he was going to kill her.

She testified:
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I had never seen him like this. I had never seen
his eyes — I had never seen his face contorted to
the point where he was completely uncontrollablef
where he — I couldn't talk to him. He just kept
saying, "I am going to kill youf you bitch. I am
going to kill you, you bitch. You don't deserve
to live." And he just — he wouldn't stop.... But
all this time he was telling me he was going to
kill me. And he told me — just screaming things
at me. Just screaming ... He was screaming
obscenities, and things that — sometimes he
didn't even make sense. [She became] so scared of
him I knew that he was going to kill me. And he
said he was going to kill me.
(Tr. 241-243.)
As the decedent struck out at Mrs. Strieby, she ran up the
stairs again.

When he came after her, she pleaded with him to "leave

[her] alone."

He told her "I'm going to kill you, you bitch.

You've

just embarrassed me enough, and I am going to kill you."

Mrs. Strieby

testified that "he just —

He just kept

coming.

he kept coming up the stairs.

And he kept screaming at me that he could get me before I

could shoot him...."

As the decedent continued up the stairs in

pursuit of her, Mrs. Strieby fired one shot from his gun, killing him.
(Tr. 245-246.)
Mrs. Strieby was taken to the Tooele Valley Hospital emergency room where she was examined by Dr. Mark Anderson for her neck
pain and other injuries.

At trial, Dr. Anderson testified that based

on Mrs. Strieby's pain and the numbness in her hands, he initially
thought that Mrs. Strieby had suffered either a broken neck or a
ruptured cervical disk.

Dr. Anderson stated that four prior back

surgeries is an "extremely unusual" number and Mrs. Strieby's range of
motion in her back and neck was generally less than half of normal.

In addition, Mrs. Strieby had bruises on various parts of her bodyf
including bruises that were in the shape of fingers, "a classic
description of somebody being grabbed with the fingers very hard."
She also had multiple abrasions, a swollen left eye and a tender area
on her neck.

(Tr. 194-201.)

Dr. Anderson testified that Mrs. Striebyfs injuries were
consistent with being dragged down stairs on her neck and back, and
with trying to escape an attack.

Dr. Anderson further testified that

being dragged down stairs on one's neck and back could certainly have
caused death or serious bodily injury.

In fact, Dr. Anderson stated

that because of Mrs. Strieby's back problems and prior surgeries,
serious bodily injury was more likely for her.

For someone in her

condition, Dr. Anderson testified, being dragged down the stairs could
have caused paralysis or death.

(Tr. 203-204.)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

The District Court, at a bench trial, erred in not granting

appellant's motion for judgment of acquittal made at the conclusion of
the State's case-in-chief.

At that point in the trial, the issue of

self-defense had been raised and the State completely failed to prove
that appellant did not act in self-defense.
2.

The District Court's verdict of manslaughter was against the

clear weight of the evidence on the issue of self-defense.

Not only

did the State fail to prove in its case that appellant did not act in
self-defense, but evidence presented by the defense created further
reasonable doubt.
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3.

The District Court erred in not granting appellant's motion

for a new trial, as its sole theory to find beyond a reasonable doubt
that appellant did not act in self-defense was not based on a scintilla of evidence but was simply a speculative leap across the State's
gap in the evidence.
4.

The District Court's order of restitution was procedurally

and substantially illegal because no reasons for the order were given
and because restitution cannot be ordered for collateral loss to
persons arguably collaterally injured by an offender's conduct.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT'S
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL.

At the conclusion of the State's case-in-chief, appellant made a
motion for judgment of acquittal on the basis that the government had
failed to meet its burden of proof.

Specifically/ appellant argued

that the State failed to prove in its own case, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that Mrs. Strieby did not act in self-defense.
In reviewing the District Court's verdict, it is important to
emphasize that appellant was tried at a bench trial.

The Utah Supreme

Court has clearly established that a more probing and less deferential
standard of review is to be applied in a bench trial, as compared to a
jury trial.

As the Court noted in State v. Goodman, 763 P.2d 786

(Utah 1988):
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When reviewing a bench trial for sufficiency
of the evidence, we must sustain the trial court's
judgment unless it is "against the clear weight of
the evidence, or if the appellate court otherwise
reaches a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." . . . [Tlhis standard
accords "appropriate recognition of the relative
deference owed multi-member panels as opposed to
single-judge findings." Under this less deferential
standard, the likelihood that a defendant's conviction will be reversed following a bench trial, as
opposed to a jury trial, is increased. . . .
[Tlhis standard requires that the clear weight of
the evidence presented at trial not be contrary to
the verdict. . . . Even if the clear weight of
the evidence supports the verdict, however, this
Court will reverse if it otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
made, thus providing the defendant an additional
opportunity to obtain a reversal.
. . . In reviewing a bench trial for sufficiency
of the evidence, we require that the weight of the
evidence, discounting questions of credibility and
demeanor, not oppose the verdict. Hence, a defendant's conviction must still be based on evidence
establishing guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but,
on appeal, the standard of review aids the defendant in his efforts to obtain a reversal. . . .
Id. at 786-87 (footnotes and citations omitted).
By contrast, as this Court has noted, in a jury trial:
[Tlhe standard for reversal is high. "We reverse
... only when the evidence ... is sufficiently
inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable
doubt that the defendant committed the crime...."
. . . Furthermore, all evidence and reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom must be reviewed in a
light most favorable to the jury's verdict. . . .
State v. Harman, 767 P.2d 567, 568 (Utah App. 1989).
ing a jury trial, this Court has noted that:
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Even in review-

Although this is a high standard, it is not
insurmountable. We will not make "speculative
leapfs] across ... remaining gapfs]" in the
evidence. . . . Every element of the crime
charged must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
If the evidence does not support those elements,
the verdict must fail.
Id. at 568.
Applying those principles to the instant case, the State had the
burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt, by competent evidence,
that Mrs. Strieby did not act in self-defense.

In that regard. State

v. Knoll, 712 P.2d 211 (Utah 1985) is controlling.

Therein, the Utah

Supreme Court held that, although the absence of self-defense is not
one of the prima facie elements of homicide, once the issue is raised,
it is the prosecution's burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant did not act in self-defense:
[A] defendant is not required to establish a
defense of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt,
or even by a preponderance of the evidence. . . .
In sum, when there is a basis in the evidence,
whether the evidence is produced by the prosecution or by the defendant, which would provide some
reasonable basis for the jury to conclude that a
killing was done to protect the defendant from an
imminent threat of death by another, an instruction on self-defense should be given the jury.
And if the issue is raised, whether by the
defendant's or by the prosecution's evidence, the
prosecution has the burden of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt that the killing was not in selfdefense.
Id. at 214 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
The only evidence presented by the government on what happened
during the decedent's assault on Mrs. Strieby came from the taped
statement of Mrs. Strieby.

In the absence of any other evidence, much

less any conflicting evidence, the statement itself clearly created a
reasonable doubt on the issue of self-defense on which the State had
1 A

the entire burden of proof.

Most importantly, a finding at the end of

the government's case that a reasonable doubt did not exist on that
issue is overwhelmingly against the clear weight of the evidence.
Indeed, no evidence existed on that issue other than Mrs. Strieby's
statement.
In the absence of any evidence to support its case, the government completely failed to carry its burden of proof on the issue of
self-defense.

It did not offer any evidence whatsoever in its case to

establish that Mrs. Strieby did not act in self-defense.

To the

contrary, Mrs. Strieby's statement and the testimony of Dr. Sweeney
offered strong evidentiary support for self-defense.

For example,

Dr. Sweeney testified that, due to the decedent's blood alcohol level
of .25, his judgment and self-control would have been seriously
impaired.

This testimony fully corroborated Mrs. Strieby's statement

regarding the decedent's uncharacteristic rage, refusal to quit beating her and repeated threats to kill her when he got ahold of her.

In

short, the only evidence presented was that of a 200 pound muscular,
burly man in a wild, drunken state, more of an animal than a man,
driven to seriously injure or kill his wife.

The District Court's

denial of appellant's motion for judgment of acquittal was erroneous
3
and against the clear weight of the evidence.

The District Court's error was compounded by its failure to grant
even a partial acquittal on second degree murder. As a result of this
error, appellant was placed in the position of being strategically
forced to present evidence in her behalf. Had the District Court
granted her motion, even in part, appellant's range of decisions and
choices would have been substantially broader including, e.g., to have
remained silent at trial.

-15-

II.

THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL WAS
NOT SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THE TRIAL
COURTfS VERDICT OF MANSLAUGHTER.

At the end of the bench trial, the District Court rendered a
verdict of manslaughter.
the evidence.

This verdict is against the clear weight of

At the conclusion of its case-in-chief, the State had

failed entirely to present any evidence conflicting with Mrs. Strieby's
account of self-defense as set forth in her statement/ much less prove
beyond a reasonable doubt/ as required/ that she did not act in selfdefense.

Moreover/ Mrs. Striebyfs defense further bolstered her claim

and created even more doubt.
In her own defense/ Mrs. Strieby offered additional strong
evidence of self-defense.

Her trial testimony gave further detail

regarding the decedent's relentless assault and his repeated threats
to take her life on that night.

Mrs. Strieby testified that she had

never before seen such a crazed look in the decedent' eyesr nor had he
ever perpetrated such a savage attack upon her or threatened to kill
her.

Mrs. Strieby further testified that/ in the course of the battle/

she attempted to escape by running upstairs but that the decedent
dragged her down the stairs on her neck and back.

Because of a

previous broken back and subsequent back surgeries/ this alone could
have caused serious bodily injury or death to Mrs. Strieby.

In fact/

it did cause serious bodily injury to her as reflected in the testimony of Dr. Mark Anderson who confirmed the extent and serious nature
of injuries inflicted on Mrs. Strieby by the decedent.

Dr. Anderson

explained how the decedent's beating of Mrs. Striebyf andf specifically/ how dragging her down stairs on her back and neckf caused her
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serious bodily injury and could easily have caused her death*

In sum,

the clear weight of the evidence at trial established that Mrs* Strieby
shot the decedent in self-defense to protect herself from serious
bodily injury or death.

But, even more importantly, the evidence

clearly did not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that she did not
act in self-defense.
In reviewing the verdict at a bench trial, this Court must "discount questions of credibility and demeanor". State v. Goodman, supra,
763 P.2d at 787.4 In this case, however, even that requirement is not
significant since the District Court credited Mrs. Strieby's testimony.
Specifically, in the course of delivering its verdict of manslaughter,
the District Court acknowledged that there were no substantial conflicts in the evidence.

(Tr. 319.)

The District Court further stated

that it had "no substantial reason to doubt Mrs. Strieby's version."
(Tr. 321.)

In fact, the District Court specifically found that the

decedent had resumed beating Mrs. Strieby upon arriving home and
further indicated that it had "no substantial doubt about the reality"
of her fear for her life, given the decedent's "powerful muscular
build."

(Tr. 323.)

Notwithstanding the clear and unrebutted evidence indicating that
Mrs. Strieby acted in self-defense, the District Court found that her

That does not mean that this Court cannot, in appropriate circumstances, evaluate a witness' testimony. For example, in State v.
Walker, 743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987), the Supreme Court reversed a conviction in a bench trial when it found a key witness' testimony
unreliable. Walker at 197-198. In the instant case, the District
Court credited appellant's testimony which makes the verdict even more
erroneous.
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shooting of the decedent was not legally justifiable.

Under the appli-

cable , less deferential standard of review, it is clear that the
District Courtfs verdict must be reversed as against the clear weight
of the evidence.

The evidence presented by both the prosecution and

the defense established self-defense.

Most importantly, the State

offered no evidence which even remotely indicated that Mrs. Strieby
did not act in self-defense and, thus, it completely failed to prove
the absence of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt.

This is

precisely the kind of case, under Goodman, where less deference is
owed to a "single-judge" finding.

Therefore, the District Court's

verdict of manslaughter must be reversed.
III.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING
APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL.

Following entry of the judgment of conviction, Mrs. Strieby filed
a motion for a new trial.

This motion was in response to the District

Court's improbable, and totally hypothetical, theory concerning the
blue plastic cup found on the landing near the decedent's body

—

raised for the first time by the Court in announcing its decision.

In

delivering its verdict, the District Court hypothesized that the decedent —

in the midst of his violent, drunken and ruthless attack on

Mrs. Strieby —

stopped and "went into the kitchen and poured himself

a drink," and that, with drink in hand, he then followed Mrs. Strieby
upstairs.

This conclusion by the District Court is not supported by a

scintilla of evidence.

There was absolutely no evidence that the dece-

dent fixed himself a drink during the heat of the assault on his wife,
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nor any evidence presented by the State th5?*- +\.

iecedent did not

bring the cup with him from the trailer where he had been drinking
vodka a 11 day »
M r s . Strieby's affidavit, submitted in support of her
motion, establishes that there was in fact no hard liquor in the condominium.

In its search o-

n<* scene f the T'ooe] e County Sheri f f s

Department failed to locate any alcohol or evidence of alcohol., with
the exception of < • -TTT*L " beer can.

(Ex. B, attached 1; o Memorandum in

Support of Motion for

In fact r the officers observed

-*w Trial.)

that the condominium wa. clean and well-kept.
c a n. 11 y , a 11 h o u g h < - •

(Tr. 2:4)

Signifi-

o p p o r f:: u n i t y a n d ::> b ] :i g a t i o i : , t o

M r s . Strieby's affidavit, the State offered nothing to refute it, The
District Court's theory on the blue plastic cup is thus entirely without evidentiary support.
The District Court relied on its illogical and unsupported theory
to make a bootst .rap finding that there was a "reasonable, substantial
cessatior* n
n

he attack on M r s . Strieby, so that the decedent was not

i n vigorous, hot pursuit" at the time she ran up the stairs and got

the qun - On this basis,, i t found her gu i 1 ty of mansljuqhtei

(Tr

324-326.)
The District Court l c ? c o n c l u s i o n unsupported by any evidence, was
c 1 e a i d 111, :l p r e j u d I c i a I <

*

of "speculative leapfs] across
condemned by this Court.

.: :

--

remaining g a p t s ] * in rre evidence

State v. Harman, supra

ing from State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 4 4 3 , 445 (U*
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*

,2d at 5 6 8 , q u o t ^

- ; s . Strieby

J

was entitled to a new trial, and the District Court erred in denying
her motion.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURTfS ORDER OF
RESTITUTION WAS ILLEGAL.

At the time of sentencing, the District Court ordered appellant
to pay restitution in an amount to be fixed and assessed by the Board
of Pardons at the time of her release.

(Tr. 343.)

The State argued

that Mrs. Strieby should be required to pay full restitution for
funeral and related expenses, as well as for therapy for the decedent's
daughter.

Counsel for Mrs. Strieby argued that restitution was

improper because appellant was impecunious and unable to obtain gainful employment because of her back injuriesf so that she had no
ability to pay restitution.

(Tr. 334-336.)

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (Supp. 1989) governs the imposition of
restitution in criminal cases.

It sets forth particular factors to be

considered by the Court and specific procedures to be followed by the
Court, including the requirement that "Iwlhether the court determines
that restitution is appropriate or inappropriate, the court shall make
the reasons for the decision a part of the court record."
(3)(a)(i).

§ 76-3-201

The District Court's failure to consider the stated criteria

and to set forth in the record its reasons for ordering restitution,
as mandated by the statute, is clear error.

On this procedural basis

alone, the District Court's order of restitution is illegal.
More importantly, the order of restitution is illegal because
Mrs. Strieby has no ability to pay.

This Court has held that fines

and restitution are generally disfavored for defendants who lack the
ability to pay.
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State v, Peterson, 681 P.2d 1210 (1984)
imprisoned for d&bt
ability to pav

Furthermore, one cannot be

or for contempt •- li

one does not have Hie

See Utah Constitution, Article I § 16; Harris v.

Harris, 377 P.2d 100? (Utah 1963).
In add I 11 on , t he o r de t \•> i t es111 u 11 \>n i s i I 1 ega I hec:ause 11.
requires restitution to individuals who are not "victims."

Section

76-3-201 (4) (d) defines a "victim" as a person who has suffered
pecuniary damages as a result of the defendants criminal activities*
Pecuniary damages are further defined as special damages which could
b e r e c o v e r e d a g a I n s t t h e d e f e n d a n t i i I a • :::: i i * :i 1 a c t i o n, s u c h a s

ff

11 i e

money equivalent of property taken, destroyed, broken or otherwise
harmed, and losses such as earnings and medical expenses."
direct consequences of

These are

thi s • ::ase, the i:esti-

tution sought is not for pecuniary harm to the decedent.

It is also

not for any property damage or similar losses directly attributable to
Mrs. Strieby f s actions.

Rather, the restitution sought is for

collateral consequences to individuals arguably collaterally injured.
Theiapy for the decedent's daughter

is simply not tiip type u-f direct

pecuniary damage contemplated by the statute.

See People v. Catron,

678 P.2d 1 (Ct- App, Colo, 1984) I "victim" refets to the party immediately ai: id ill rect; J y aqgi, leved by the criin.in-M *n*' • and not to others
who suffer loss because of some relationship, contractual or otherwise, to the directly aggrieved party),

Although "victim" is broadly

defined, the 1:erIII n p e c u n :i ar y damages, n s11: i c11 y cons11: ued •.

=;quI r ed

in a criminal case, is limited to payment of direct damages to the
di rect v:i cti ms of an offender f s conduct.

For these reasons, the District Courtfs order of restitution was
illegal.

CONCLUSION
The appellantfs conviction must be reversed/ orf in the alternative f the case should be remanded for a new trial, and the order of
restitution should be vacated.
Respectfully submitted this 3rd day of August/ 1989.
CLYDE/ PRATT & SNOW

NEJC, 4. KAPLA1
ANNELI R. SMITH
Attorneys for Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Brief of Appellant to be mailed/ postage prepaid/ to the
following this 3rd day of August/ 1989:
R. Paul Van Dam
Utah Attorney General
Sandra L. Sjogren
Assistant Utah Attorney General
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorneys for Respondent
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76-3*201. Sentences or combination of sentences allowed
— Civil penalties — Restitution — Definitions —
Resentencing — Aggravation or mitigation of
crimes with mandatory sentences.
(1) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may sentence a
person adjudged guilty of an offense to any one of the following sentences or
combination of them:
(a) to pay a fine;
(b) to removal from or disqualification of public or private office;
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law;
(d) to imprisonment; or
(e) to death.
(2) This chapter does not deprive a court of authority conferred by law to
forfeit property, dissolve a corporation, suspend or cancel a license, or permit
removal of a person from office, cite for contempt, or impose any other civil
penalty. A civil penalty may be included in a sentence.
(3) (a) (i) When a person is adjudged guilty of criminal activity which has
resulted in pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it
may impose, the court shall order that the defendant make restitution up to double the amount of pecuniary damages to the victim or
victims of the offense of which the defendant has pleaded guilty, is
convicted, or to the victim of any other criminal conduct admitted by
the defendant to the sentencing court unless the court in applying the
criteria in Subsection (3)(b) finds that restitution is inappropriate.
Whether the court determines that restitution is appropriate or inappropriate, the court shall make the reasons for the decision a part of
the court record.
(ii) When a defendant has been extradited to this state under
Chapter 30, Title 77, or has been transported at governmental expense from one county to another within the state for the purpose of
resolving pending criminal charges, and is adjudged guilty of criminal activity in the county to which he has been returned, the court
may, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, order that the
defendant make restitution for costs expended by any governmental
entity for the extradition or transportation. In determining whether
restitution is appropriate, the court shall consider the criteria in
Subsection (3)(b). If the court determines that restitution is appropriate or inappropriate, the court shall make the reasons for the decision
a part of the court record. The court shall send a copy of its order of
restitution to the Division of Finance.
(b) In determining whether or not to order restitution, or restitution
which is complete, partial, or nominal, the court shall take into account:
(i) the financial resources of the defendant and the burden that
payment of restitution will impose, with regard to the other obligations of the defendant;
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an installment
basis or on other conditions to be fixed by the court;
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of
restitution and the method of payment; and
20
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(iv) other circumstances which the court determines make restitution inappropriate.
(c) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of
the restitution, the court shall at the time of sentencing allow him a full
hearing on the issue.
(4) As used in Subsection (3):
(a) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is
convicted or any other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits
responsibility to the sentencing court with or without an admission of
committing the criminal conduct.
(b) "Pecuniary damages" means all special damages, but not general
damages, which a person could recover against the defendant in a civil
action arising out of the facts or events constituting the defendant's criminal activities and includes, but is not limited to, the money equivalent of
property taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses such
as earnings and medical expenses.
(c) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary
damages to a victim, including insured damages.
(d) "Victim" means any person whom the court determines has suffered
pecuniary damages as a result of the defendant's criminal activities. "Victim" does not include any coparticipant in the defendant's criminal activities.
(5) (a) If a statute under which the defendant was convicted mandates that
one of three stated minimum terms shall be imposed, the court shall order
imposition of the term of middle severity unless there are circumstances
in aggravation or mitigation of the crime.
(b) Prior to or at the time of sentencing, either party may submit a
statement identifying circumstances in aggravation or mitigation, or presenting additional facts. If the statement is in writing, it shall be filed
with the court and served on the opposing party at least four days prior to
the time set for sentencing.
(c) In determining whether there are circumstances that justify imposition of the highest or lowest term, the court may consider the record in
the case, the probation officer's report, other reports, including reports
received under Section 76-3-404, statements in aggravation or mitigation
submitted by the prosecution or the defendant, and any further evidence
introduced at the sentencing hearing.
(d) The court shall set forth on the record the facts supporting and
reasons for imposing the upper or lower term.
(e) The court in determining a just sentence shall be guided by sentencing rules regarding aggravation and mitigation promulgated by the Judicial Council.
(6) (a) If a defendant subject to Subsection (5) has been sentenced and committed to the Utah State Prison, the court may, within 120 days of the
date of commitment on its own motion, or at any time upon the recommendation of the Board of Pardons, recall the sentence and commitment
previously ordered and resentence the defendant in the same manner as if
he had not previously been sentenced, so long as the new sentence is no
greater than the initial sentence nor less than the mandatory time prescribed by statute. The resentencing provided for in this section shall
comply with the sentencing rules of the Judicial Council to eliminate
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